In this note we establish that rational demand expectations will typically not evolve in an evolutionary model. In an evolutionary model beliefs act like a commitment device to more aggressive behavior. This commitment effect has the same direction for strategic substitutes and complements and fades away in large markets.
It has been established that rational cost expectations will typically not emerge in an evolutionary model (Güth, 1998) . In the context of a simple market model individuals tend to entertain over-optimistic beliefs about their rival's costs inducing more aggressive behavior relative to a rational expectations model. Thus the evolving beliefs act as if the rivals could strategically commit to more aggressive beliefs, what is individually but not collectively rational for the competing firms. A similar phenomenon is described in the context of bargaining by Heifetz and Segev (2004) where the individuals misperceive their valuations of the object and asymptotically the population will consist entirely of individuals with inherent toughness bias.
A strategic choice of beliefs would, however, be rather questionable: one would first choose one's beliefs and then definitely accept those just chosen beliefs when deciding about market behavior (see also Frank, 1997 , and BarHillel and Budescu, 1995, for a discussion of such wishful thinking).
In this note we perform a similar analysis for demand expectations. We want to analyze, whether the strategic properties (strategic complementarity vs. strategic substitutability) affect the nature of the commitment effect (according to Bester and Güth, 1998 , this distinction is crucial). Moreover we want to analyze the relation between evolutionarily stable and rational expectations in large markets.
Not surprisingly, we confirm non-convergence to rational expectations also in the case of demand uncertainty. More interestingly, we find that the commitment effect always has the same direction, both for strategic complements and for strategic substitutes. In both cases firms tend to "commit" to more aggressive behavior in the evolutionary model. The commitment effect, however, declines as the number of (symmetric) competitors grows large. Hence on large markets rational expectations seem (asymptotically) justified by an evolutionary process.
1
Consider a (horizontally) differentiated market environment with n firms.
Market demand is implicitly defined by a system of linear and symmetric inverse demand functions
The parameter γ defines the strategic properties of the price instrument.
Products are economic and strategic complements (see Bülow, Geanakoplos, Klemperer, 1985) when
> 0 , i.e. γ < 0 and substitutes and strategic substitutes when
Otherwise the products are independent and competition becomes monopolistic (Chamberlin, 1933 , Robinson, 1933 ).
The true realization of y is unknown and determined by nature according to the density function ϕ having mean µ . Individual firms entertain homegrown beliefs f i about the probability distribution ϕ . So, the expected profit function of the vector x = (x 1 , ..., x n ) of individual sales amounts is
Due to the linear structure of the market model, only the first moments µ , µ i of distribution functions ϕ, f i matter. We therefore will analyse the (evolution of) first moments only. In our evolutionary analysis this can be justified by an infinite population of sellers who are randomly matched to nseller markets. Given their beliefs firms select prices rationally by maximizing expected profits. Note that these beliefs may be quite different across firms.
In a rational expectations model in contrast all competitors are forced to entertain the same rationally expected demand parameter µ . In our model firms can entertain whatever beliefs they please.
However, evolutionary pressure will ultimately eliminate beliefs that can be improved upon and substitute them by better adjusted beliefs. Whether an alternative belief type leads to an improvement is, however, judged by the true profit expectation, i.e. changing beliefs directly imply different expected utilities, but can determine reproductive success (expected true profits) only indirectly via market behavior. In evolutionary language, belief mutants will enter a given population of beliefs as long as these mutants earn more than average success. To keep the model simple we abstract from production costs.
Remark. We restrict ourselves to economically suitable γ's, i.e. we suppose that in the case of strategic substitutes the cross-impact of firm j's output x j on the price of p i is not bigger than the impact of own output x i , i.e. γ ≤ n − 1 . In other words, more (less) similar goods rely on larger (smaller) parameters γ with the border cases γ = 0 of monopolistic competition and γ = n − 1 of identical goods, i.e. the homogeneous market.
Results
Given their beliefs µ i firms maximize their individually expected profit functions (??) as determined by their own idiosyncratic belief type µ i . The necessary first order conditions read
From (??) we get the equilibrium what, of course, presupposes that individual beliefs are commonly known:
definite. Therefore, the matrix of the system has to be positive definite, because it equals the Hessian matrix multiplied by minus one. Since its principal minors are
and we presuppose that γ < n − 1 the second order condition holds for γ > −2 ; otherwise the extreme point is a minimum and the profit maximizing amounts x * diverge to infinity. Note that the same condition holds in the standard rational expectation model, where the structure of the Hessian matrix is identical. Naturally, we restrict ourselves to condition γ > −2 .
Finally, we abstract from the border case γ = 0 of no strategic interaction or monopolistic competition. Thus the set of all possible heterogeneity param-
With the help of these solutions we can now define the evolutionary game for studying the evolution of beliefs. Here the strategies are the possible belief types and the reproductive success is the true expected profit. Although µ i determines seller i's market behavior, as derived above, the evolution of beliefs is governed by the true demand (parameter) µ, i.e. by material success only. For the one-parametric mutant space µ i ∈ [0, +∞) we get a unique symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition. For all n ≥ 2 there exists a critical γ n ∈ (−2, −1) such that for all γ ∈ (γ n , n − 1] the unique evolutionarily stable belief type or equilibrium belief is characterized by
For γ ≤ γ n the revenue is unbounded and the beliefs diverge.
Corollary.
For all suitable γ ∈ Γ all firms produce more than in the rational expectation case (with µ i = µ for all i = 1, ..., n).
Proof. For γ > γ n the statement follows from the fact that ρ > 0 . For −2 < γ ≤ γ n the amounts x * i diverge to infinity, while they are finite in the rational expectation model. 2 Note that beliefs µ * i exceed µ for all γ ∈ Γ , i.e. the direction of the commitment effect is not affected by the strategic properties of prices, i.e. strategic complementarity or strategic substitutability. As the evolution of altruism depends on this property (see Bester and Güth, 1998) this result is a bit surprising. The explanation is that altruism only concerns the own best response whereas beliefs about market demand in our setup influence not only the own best response but also the expected optimal response by others.
Finally notice
1 that for all γ ∈ Γ lim n→∞ ρ = 0 and lim n→∞ γ n = −2 . So, with increasing n, the system converges to the standard rational expectation case. Hence, over-optimism is especially pronounced in small markets. Put differently, rational expectations become evolutionarily stable whenever the commitment advantage fades away due to increasing competition as measured by n.
